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In the contemporary environment, in which fiscal responsibility is a priority, each 
United States government (USG) organization must do more with less. The Department 
of Defense (DOD) is compelled to conduct military operations across the globe with 
fewer service members, and the Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) are both being asked to conduct interventions with 
less capital, fewer foreign service officers, and fewer field representatives. Expectations 
concerning positive results have not been commensurately adjusted. This research has 
identified which sectors of U.S. foreign aid monies were allocated between 2011 and 
2015 and what effect aid is having on creating stable sovereign nations and ultimately 
avoiding the onset of conflict. First, using multivariate regression models, the researchers 
analyzed which World Development Indicators have the strongest negative correlation 
with the onset of state internal conflict around the world. Following this analysis, the 
researchers examined which sectors of foreign aid in DOD, DOS, and USAID have had 
the most significant correlation to the onset of internal conflict. The models considered 
the level of violence as well as the cost and number of projects performed in a given 
country to determine the probability of internal conflict. The results of the research show 
that the USG is not increasing stability through reducing internal conflict. In fact, it 
appears the USG is provoking internal conflict through foreign aid. Therefore, it is 
incumbent on the USG to thoroughly analyze which areas and types of foreign aid should 
be disbursed to achieve desired stability and reduced internal conflict.  
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
There is little question that the spectrum of potential U.S. adversaries is both 
broad and ambiguous. Though there is a level of uncertainty regarding who the next 
global belligerent will be, it is safe to assume that the United States of America will be 
one of its primary targets. Why the United States is often designated as the quintessential 
antagonist of insurgent groups is a hotly debated question but not the question addressed 
in this research. The United States simply must focus on preparing for the inevitable. 
That preparation includes but is not limited to having the appropriate U.S. Government 
(USG) force structure with the right personnel, who have the necessary skills sets and 
capabilities in the right quantities, conducting the most efficient and effective activities to 
help avoid direct, kinetic engagement.  
In 2008, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, 
warned congressional legislators, “we can’t kill our way to victory, and no armed force 
anywhere, no matter how good” is capable of achieving objectives using only kinetic 
methods.1 Chair Mullen recognized that in addition to teamwork and partnerships, the 
USG needed to apply both the carrot and the stick. The use of foreign aid is a textbook 
example of the carrot and stick idiom. When implemented effectively, foreign aid can be 
both the carrot and the stick. To grant foreign aid to an ally or an adversary is a carrot that 
can be dangled to convince said nation to continue an action that is in the U.S. interests, 
or to discontinue an action that is contrary to U.S. interests. To withhold foreign aid, even 
when an ally or an adversary is in most dire need, can be equally as effective in 
convincing it to begin, continue, or discontinue a particular action or activity. In many 
ways, foreign aid is akin to a conventional weapon system. While this particular weapon 
is not as awe-inspiring as a multi-million dollar aircraft carrier or as intimidating as a 
stealth bomber, we suggest that the purpose of foreign aid should be used similarly as a 
tool to assist in achieving tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. We disagree 
holistically and vehemently with the  
                                                 
1 “Admiral: Troops Alone will not Yield Victory in Afghanistan,” CNN, September 10, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/10/mullen.afghanistan/.  
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widely held [belief] that foreign aid is an end in itself, carrying its own 
justification, both transcending, and independent of, foreign policy. In this 
view, foreign aid is the fulfillment of an obligation of the few rich nations 
toward the many poor ones.2  
Like other “weapons,” the ability to grant or withhold foreign aid is most effective 
when the United States is the only entity that has the ability to use it. While it would be 
preferable if the United States and its allies were the only nation states with the foresight, 
the desire, the ability, and the capability to grant or withhold foreign aid, this is not the 
case. Adversaries of the United States also have the ability to disseminate foreign aid, and 
their ultimate goals may run contrary to U.S. goals and objectives. Unlike military 
technologies, such as drones today or the Henry repeating rifle of the American Civil 
War or the Battle of Little Big Horn, wherein a particular capability was controlled 
primarily by one side and not the other, today’s conflicts are different. The ability for any 
nation state or non-state actor to implement foreign aid is ubiquitous. To implement 
foreign aid only requires that one has something to give to a group of individuals that 
themselves cannot acquire, or at least adequately acquire or provide, for themselves. 
When we think about U.S. foreign aid, one might have visions of huge pallets of 
emergency rations, blankets, and potable water, millions of dollars in economic aid, or 
the millions of dollars spent annually by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). All of these are excellent examples of U.S. foreign aid policy 
and implementation; however, all foreign aid need not be so large in scale or visibility or 
as obvious.  
While the United States may have more money to spend on foreign aid than some 
other countries, this does not imply that other countries, particularly potential adversaries, 
do not have anything to spend on foreign aid or assistance. There are also countries such 
as the People’s Republic of China, for example, which have intent and policy vastly 
different than that of the United States, with as much or more money to allocate toward 
building relationships through foreign assistance. Finally, it is not only how much aid is 
provided but how it is applied, to whom, and in what capacity. Similar to many other 
                                                 
2 Hans J. Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” American Political Science Review 56, no. 
2 (1962): 301–309.  
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disciplines, including but not limited to training, platforms, and project implementation, it 
is not only a product of monies allocated, but how and where, and more specifically, in 
which categories it is apportioned that matters most. Put another way, foreign aid need be 
measured by effectiveness, not simply by the ability to implement a particular activity.  
Similar to a kinetic weapon system, foreign aid has a long history and has 
changed dramatically throughout history. Foreign aid has morphed dramatically since its 
implementation during the Marshall Plan, as have opinions on the use and effectiveness 
of foreign aid. Just as with kinetic weapons, foreign aid cannot and should not be used as 
a standalone measure. As with the concussion grenade (more commonly known as a 
flash-bang), aid is not an effective tool unless followed by a heavily armed stack of 
practiced soldiers well trained on how to breach, enter, and clear a room. Foreign aid is 
not a panacea, nor is it something to be disseminated like a psychological operations 
leaflet drop or Tinkerbelle’s fairy-dust—dropped with the hope that it lands on or near its 
intended target. Rather, it is imperative that foreign aid delivery is well planned, precise, 
and coordinated and that it is then disseminated to or through an implementing partner. 
Delivery of foreign aid should be to be executed with the precision of a surgeon using a 
scalpel and monitored with the meticulousness of a comptroller analyzing a financial 
report.  
There have been many examples of ineffective foreign aid distribution whereby 
millions of dollars are allocated to assisting a nation state in need, or a non-state actor, 
only to see an already poor situation deteriorate into even direr conditions. Worse yet, 
there are also examples in which of millions of dollars in foreign aid, designed to help 
those in need, is pilfered by those charged with managing and distributing it. Examples 
include Mogadishu Somalia in 1993 and more recently numerous convoys looted by 
military members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. According to 
Transparency International, the subject matter experts in the fight against corruption, 
“…the scale of the issue is huge. Sixty-eight percent of countries worldwide have a 
serious corruption problem.”3 It is as a result of some of these instances that there has 
                                                 
3 Transparency International: The Global Coalition Against Corruption, “Corruption Perception Index 
2015.”  cpi2015. 
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been a recent shift in the way foreign aid is perceived. According to Summers in a 
Washington Post opinion piece, 
The motivation behind the current rethinking on aid is aptly summarized 
by Lawrence Summers: ‘I have seen close to a dozen cases over the past 
quarter century where the precedent of the Marshall plan was invoked. 
None was as successful as the original. This reflects the truth that 
functioning institutions cannot be imposed from outside. Countries and 
their peoples shape their own destinies.4 
Summers and others have asserted that while aid can serve as an extremely 
effective weapon, it is not useful in all circumstances. Summers alludes here to the fact 
that poor or ineffective financial management, lack of functional institutions, and 
corruption can be inhibitors to granting financial aid.5 Additionally, some potential aid 
recipient nation states may not acquiesce to the desired end state of the aid grantor. In 
these cases, foreign aid granted would be wasted money and an alternate method for 
convincing the potential recipient may have to be identified and implemented—perhaps 
via kinetic action or another non-kinetic measure. 
While it is preferable that those countries receiving foreign aid are democratic 
countries that will provide impartially for every citizen of the country, this is not always 
the case. Often, foreign aid is given as a hedge against actual and potential adversaries in 
the region or to a nation state that does not necessarily share our American ideals or 
values but that is nonetheless a better ally and alternative to other less friendly nation 
states in the region. 
                                                 
4 Lawrence Summers, “Lawrence Summers: How to Provide the Best Aid to Ukraine,” The 
Washington Post, March 9, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lawrence-summers-how-to-
provide-the-best-aid-to-ukraine/2014/03/09/30adfba4-a623-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html.  
5 Ibid.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
To adequately analyze and determine the appropriate initiatives and activities of 
USG intervention and how foreign aid can assist in complementing kinetic activities and/ 
or serve as a prevention tool to direct, hostile action, the executors of foreign aid must 
first understand the nature of future conflict will resemble. There are two general post-
Cold War philosophies regarding the anticipated nature of future conflict; each is 
distinctly different, and each is plausible. Authors Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. 
Kugler characterize the two distinct and contrasting philosophies as the neo-Kantian and 
the neo-Hobbesian theories on the future of conflict.6 
The neo-Hobbesian philosophy is much akin to the realist perspective, and its 
historical father is Hans Morgenthau.7 More recently, global security officials, such as 
Zbigniew Brzezinski and current U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha 
Power, have championed the neo-Hobbesian philosophy. The neo-Hobbesian point of 
view paints a distinctly different picture than the one described by the neo-Kantians; 
specifically, it describes a significantly more “realpolitik” picture wherein each sovereign 
country’s pursuit of power, even at the expense of a fellow democratic power, let alone, a 
non-democratic nation state.8 Supporters of the neo-Hobbesian theory describe an 
international system that is fraught with chaos and anarchy. Additionally, they cite 
historical examples such as the issues in the Balkans, in numerous areas throughout 
Africa in the last two decades, and more recently in Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, 
Sudan, and South Sudan. Whether over resources or borders or between ethnic majorities 
and minorities, both relatively minor and major conflict has been a persistent element in 
the global arena before and after the end of the Cold War. Arguably, the number of 
conflicts has grown since the end of the Cold War. The intensity of most of those 
                                                 
6 Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security 
(Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense Press, 2006).  
7 Hans J. Morgenthau, Power and Transcendence (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002).  
8 Zbigniew Brezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic 
Books, 2012); Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: 
Basic Books, 2002).  
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conflicts may not be comparable to the state-on-state (or states-on-states) engagements 
experienced in World War I or World War II. However, the consequences for those 
nations, their respective militaries, and their respective populaces’ do not differ greatly. 
With the rise of direct connectivity in the form of near instant air travel and the 
instantaneous ability to connect indirectly, and inconspicuously, through the use of 
information technology, insurgent ideology and sentiment can spread and gain 
momentum at a pace not previously possible.  
On the other hand, the neo-Kantian theorists, such as Samuel Huntington and 
Francis Fukuyama, cite the post-Cold War successes in regions such as Eurasia and Latin 
America as archetypal examples of a near-universal ideology and desire for peace, 
security, and democracy.9 Unfortunately, the fervor with which anti-West and/or anti-
American sentiment has spread since the end of the Cold War is as astonishing as it is 
troublesome. While there are some nation states and individuals that fall somewhere 
between direct and ardent support for one side or the other, the chasm between Western 
ideology and anti-Western sentiment has never been more expansive. This polarization 
between the two parties combine with the repercussions of not organizing quickly and 
efficiently to engage effectively could prove catastrophic for the United States. While 
there are some weapon systems, initiatives, and activities currently being conducted that 
need be sustained, there are others that need be terminated.  
Regardless of which post-Cold War theory people subscribe to, most would agree 
that avoiding declarations of war and major combat operations, as well as the need to 
become a coalition partner in an allies’ military conflicts, is most certainly preferable to 
engaging in conflicts. Declarations of war and the activities that follow are time 
consuming, expensive, and normally include the loss of life of American service 
members. The decision of civilian and military government officials to intervene 
militarily is always a difficult one and is never undertaken casually. The process of 
averting major conflict runs the gamut from diplomacy, utilization of soft and hard 
power, deterrence techniques, civilian and military engagement with fellow nation states, 
                                                 
9 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1996).  
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as well as appropriate application of both the carrot and the stick. All of these activities 
and the myriad of additional activities characterize how the Department of Defense views 
Phase 0 operations and may assist in avoiding major conflict and engaging in war. Phase 
0, also commonly referred to as shaping operations, are defined in Joint Publication 3-0 
as  
activities [that] are executed continuously with the intent to enhance 
international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation by shaping 
perceptions and influencing adversaries’ and allies’ behavior; developing 
allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational 
operations; improving information exchange and intelligence sharing; 
providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access; and 
mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis.10  
In light of the aforementioned rationale for assistance, regardless of which side of 
the argument someone falls, it is important to address the fact that the United States is 
currently in an era of atrophy. While the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) has 
continued to climb, so has the national debt. Decade-long wars in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq have taken a financial toll as well as a toll on the military. The U.S. military, which 
ballooned in the first decade of the twenty-first century, is currently reducing force 
structure to pre-Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
levels. Budgets are shrinking and so are the number of military units as are the number of 
active duty service members in those units. The USG has reduced its foreign aid from 
approximately $47.5 billion in 2011 to approximately $34 billion planned for 2017.11 
Every office, from the Department of Defense to USAID and in between, is being asked 
to do as much or more with fewer funds fewer personnel and with minimal adjustment to 
the results they are expected to complete or the number of engagements they are executed 
to complete. It is imperative that every office be good stewards of American taxpayer 
dollars, especially now, the following question must be asked: Is the USG allocating 
funds and conducting foreign aid activities in support of the right sectors to insulate 
assisted countries from the onset of internal conflict?  
                                                 
10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3–0) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2011).  
11 Foreign Assistance, “Beta,” accessed October 7, 2016, foreignassistance.gov/explore.  
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From a philanthropic perspective, the amount of money that the United States 
allocated to 142 of the 188 countries identified as sovereign states by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2014 is admirable.12 Regrettably, foreign aid is not designed, or 
perhaps more accurately should not be designed, to meet philanthropic goals. The 
purpose of foreign aid, assistance and intervention activities are “to support global peace, 
security, and development efforts, and provide humanitarian relief during times of 
crisis.”13 Though a hotly debated topic to some, author Nicholas Eberstadt argued that 
the purpose of aid “should, without apology, augment American political power 
throughout the world…and support the postwar liberal international economic order.”14 
In fiscal year 2014, the United States spent approximately $35 billion in foreign 
aid and other general intervention activities.15 Where the money actually goes may come 
as a surprise to many. For instance, 10 percent of the foreign assistance budget went to 
Israel, just under 5 percent was allocated to activities and engagements with the 
Government of Afghanistan, and the average amount of foreign aid that a recipient 
country received was just less than $250 million.16 This number does not account for the 
millions of additional dollars spent on security assistance activities, including but not 
limited to, deployment related training engagements, subject matter expert exchanges, 
and projects facilitated by donations made to international and non-governmental 
organizations. 
According to an article by Raul Amoros,  
Of the $35 billion referenced in the report, $8.4 billion (24%) was used 
towards global health programs, $5.9 billion (17%) was used for foreign 
military financing, $4.6 billion (13%) was used for economic support, and 
$2.5 billion (7%) was for development assistance.17  
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.   
14 Nicholas Eberstadt, “Foreign Aid and American Purpose,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1989, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1989-06-01/foreign-aid-and-american-purpose.  
15 Raul Amoros, “The United States Spends $35 Billion on Foreign Aid…but Where Does the Money 




The remaining 40 percent of foreign assistance was not necessarily allocated to a specific 
sector and falls under a category of its own best described as general aid. This may 
include monies allocated to monetary assistance to respond to natural disaster and 
emergent manmade disasters. Figure 1 represents where and how much U.S. foreign aid 
was spent in 2015.   
 
Figure 1.  Where and How Much U.S. Foreign Aid Is Spent18 
According to author Amoros, in 2012–2014 approximately 76 percent of nations 
across the globe received some amount of foreign aid from the United States and the 
majority of those nations were either in the Central Command (CENTCOM) or Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) areas of responsibility.19 Additionally, Amoros goes on to state 
that the United States donated an estimated $103 billion dollars in foreign assistance from 
                                                 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid. 
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2012–2014, and it will likely continue to donate similar amounts, allocated similarly by 
both geographic location and sector.20 
Though foreign aid and assistance is not a physical instrument designed to inflict 
pain, damage, or injury to an adversary, it is nonetheless a tool that can be as effective, or 
perhaps even more so, than any kinetic weapon. It is a tool that has been used often over 
hundreds of years with great effectiveness. When used effectively, foreign aid can inhibit 
pain and help mitigate physical or psychological damage or injury to an ally or an 
adversary; conversely, the decision not to use it can prolong each. The USG’s own 
Foreign Assistance website describes foreign aid as,  
aid given by the United States to other countries to support global peace, 
security, and development efforts, and provide humanitarian relief during 
times of crisis. It is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the 
United States and vital to U.S. national security.21  
Though there are many examples of this activity, the United States’ most 
significant foray into this type of activity came on the heels of World War II in the form 
of the Marshall Plan. According to the George C. Marshall Foundation, the Marshall Plan 
was initiated and implemented to address a Europe that lay devastated and atrophied by 
years of significant conflict during WWII.22 With millions of individuals killed and 
wounded, industrial and residential centers in ruins, the transportation network and most 
physical infrastructure in shambles, intervention on behalf of the United States was 
necessary to begin rebuilding Europe and ensuring that it was revived.23 The inability of 
Europe to recover in a timely would likely have had significant negative global impacts 
in a world that was becoming increasingly interconnected. Finally, had the United States 
been unwilling to provide aid or unable to provide assistance effectively, it might have 
created a power vacuum and general instability on the continent and in the region.  
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Foreign Assistance, “Beta.”  




The overarching reasons identified above such as global peace, security, and 
development have a myriad of more specific tenets, including but not limited to 
combating terrorism, alleviating human suffering and famine, bolstering the capacity of 
allied governments, and promoting democracy. From a USG perspective, elected officials 
and USG employees should be able to agree that in most cases, our foreign assistance 
activities should not be strictly philanthropic in nature. For example, though there is a 
philanthropic need, the United States does not allocate foreign aid to the Democratic 
Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). While a nongovernmental organization (NGO) or 
implementing partner providing the foreign aid intervention may have strictly 
philanthropic intentions, at least part of the USG’s intent in providing capital for 
intervention should have the intended consequence of providing some type of benefit to 
the United States and its ultimate objectives in the village, country, or the region. With 
the possible exception of interventions resulting from exigent natural disasters or acute 
famine, we implore the foreign aid executors to use aid and assistance as another tool to 
influence allies and neutral countries to concur with U.S. objectives and affirm U.S. 
desired end states. Reciprocally, conducting the necessary analysis to effectively 
determine when not to provide or to withhold foreign aid or assistance can be as or even 
more effective than providing aid. It is in effectively determining when to withhold and 
when to grant foreign aid that we propose that aid can serve as one of the most effective 
weapons in the proverbial arsenal.  
In the current era of budgetary atrophy and the need for increased fiscal 
responsibility, we contend that it is more imperative than ever that foreign assistance 
money is allocated efficiently and effectively. Even more importantly than how efficient 
and effective foreign aid allocations are, it is imperative that we ensure that aid 
allocations are not having the exact opposite as its desired effect and ultimate outcome.  
While similar research questions have been asked previously, most have revolved around 
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stimulating growth in the recipient country, not increasing stability with the intent of 
avoiding the onset of conflict.24  
Among the previous studies, there was generally broad agreement among the 
authors about the effectiveness of foreign aid “…that giving a large amount of financial 
aid to a country with poor economic institutions and policies is not likely to stimulate 
reform, and in fact may retard it.”25 For instance, Burnside and Dollar conclude that 
foreign aid “…had a positive effect on growth in developing countries with significantly 
better than average institutions and policies, whereas aid had not positive effect in 
countries with average policies.”26 Joppe de Ree and Eleonora Nillesen found that  
“…increased aid reduces civil war duration, an effect that they attribute to the 
government’s ability to increase military spending and thus deter rebellion."27 Henrik 
Hansen and Fin Tarp in their article entitled “Aid Effectiveness Disputed,” suggest that 
the effectiveness of aid is not dependent on effective institutions or policies.28 In 
addition, Burnside and Dollar found that the intuitive assumption that “corrupt, 
incompetent government is not going to use aid wisely and outside donors are not going 
to be able to force it to change its habits.”29 In the same vein, others agree with the 
position of the Economist, which suggests that the link between growth and stability and 
foreign aid received is a tenuous one at best.30  
                                                 
24 Craig Burnside and David Dollar, Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence (Paper No. O-
2834) (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004), http://www.cgdev.org/doc/event%20docs/ 
MADS/Burside%20and%20Dollar%20-%20Aid%20Policies%20and%20Growth-
Revisiting%20the%20Evidence.pdf; William Easterly, Ross Levine, and David Roodman, New Data, New 
Doubts: A Comment on Burnside and Dollar’s “Aid, Policies, and Growth” (2000) (NBER Working Paper 
No. 9846) (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003); Patrick Guillaumont and Lisa 
Chauvet, Aid and Preformance: A Reassessment (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/WDR/stiglitz/Guillau3.pdf.  
25 Burnside and Dollar, Aid, Policies, and Growth.  
26 Ibid. 
27 De Ree, Joppe, and Eleonora Nillesen. “Aiding Violence or Peace? The Impact of Foreign Aid on 
the Risk of Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Journal of Development Economics 88, no. 2 (2009): 
301–313. 
28 Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp, “Aid Effectiveness Disputed,” Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 
1999, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62290.  
29 Burnside and Dollar, Aid, Policies, and Growth.  
30 Gabarone and Lusaka, “How to Make Aid Work,” Economist, June 24, 1999, 
http://www.economist.com/node/215635.   
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III. THEORY 
The initial intent of donating, or perhaps more accurately delivering foreign aid, 
was to “alleviate poverty and promote growth.”31 Countries began doing so before there 
was compelling evidence that there was an advantage to the donating nation.32 In the 
article entitled “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?,” authors Alberto Alesina 
and David Dollar found that there is “considerable evidence that the direction of foreign 
aid as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic needs and 
policy performance of the recipients.”33 This trend has been even more observable in 
recent years and is ubiquitous among all donors; the United States is no exception. As the 
United States does not simply provide foreign aid for purely philanthropic reasons, we 
must determine whether or not delivering foreign aid help us achieve our desired end 
state in a country or region, and if so, to what degree. Does foreign aid most efficiently 
assist the United States in reaching our intent and goals or could these goals be reached 
by other means? 
Advocates of current United States foreign aid policy historically point to Israel as 
the quintessential example of the importance, utility, and value of disseminating foreign 
aid. Israel receives approximately $3.1 billion each year in straight foreign aid from the 
United States,34 and this does not include the many millions in additional funding in the 
form of foreign military financing (FMF). According to a July 2015 Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) publication, “Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. 
foreign assistance since World War II. To date, the United States has provided Israel 
$124.3 billion in bilateral assistance.”35 While this amount is inclusive of all types of 
foreign assistance, including FMF, Israel seems a fitting recipient to determine the 
                                                 
31 Peter Boone, Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid (NBER Working Paper No. 5308) 
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995), 1. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of 
Economic Growth 5, no. 1 (2000): 33–63. 
34 Foreign Assistance, “Beta.”  
35 Jeremy M. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2015).     
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effectiveness of the allocated billions of dollars of aid. Though it is outside the scope of 
this thesis, it should be noted that neighboring Palestine receives no foreign aid monies 
from the United States. 
We suggested earlier that aid is often allocated to countries as a hedge against 
perceived or actual adversaries in a particular region. It is even preferable to allocate 
foreign aid to a nation-state that does not necessarily share our American values or ideals, 
but is nonetheless a better ally to the United States as opposed to other less friendly 
nation-states in the region. The relationship between the United States and Israel may fit 
into this category, especially in the last couple of decades of the United States’ tenuous 
relationships with Iraq, Syria, Libya, Iran, Afghanistan, and Yemen. The aforementioned 
CRS publication points to  
strong bilateral relations based on a number of factors, including robust 
domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic goals in 
the Middle East; mutual commitment to democratic values; and historical 
ties dating from U.S. support for the creation of Israel in 1948. U.S. 
foreign aid has been a major component in cementing and reinforcing 
these ties.36  
The relationship between the United States and Israel seems to be advantageous 
and the allocation of foreign aid appears to have a positive effect on Israel. Israel has 
been primarily weaned off from a significant amount of the economic assistance that it 
received in recent decades.37 Israel is a relatively stable sovereign nation, currently 
ranking 69th most unstable nation state with an elevated warning on the Fragile States 
Index,38 but comparatively, it is one of the most stable nation-states in the region. For 
many years, U.S. economic aid helped subsidize a lackluster Israeli economy, but since 
the rapid expansion of Israel’s high-tech sector and overall economy in the 1990s 
(sparked partially by U.S.-Israeli scientific cooperation), Israel has been considered a 
fully industrialized nation.39 Israel is a good example of foreign aid effectiveness, though 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Fund for Peace, “Fragile States Index 2016,” 2016, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2016. 
39 Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel.  
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results were achieved at a high monetary cost. This is further supported by comparing the 
United Nations General Assembly voting records of the United States and Israel. As an 
example, of 70 votes in 2015, Israel voted with the United States 92.9 percent of the time, 
the same frequency as our northern neighbor Canada which receives little to no aid, and 
nearly 10 percent more than staunch American ally, Australia.40  
While Israel serves as a relatively good example of foreign aid effectiveness, 
foreign aid to Israel only accounts for approximately 10 percent of the $34 billion dollars 
the United States anticipates spending in 2017.41 The argument can be made that the 
monies allocated in foreign aid to Israel is money well spent but the effectiveness of the 
remaining $30 million dollars in foreign aid monies is considerably less certain. Israel 
notwithstanding, there are an additional 139 countries that received some amount of 
foreign (economic) aid in 2014.42 Countries of note topping that list in 2013 were 
Afghanistan at $2.65 billion and the small nation state of South Sudan, which at the time 
was a burgeoning democracy, nearly $600 million.43 These two foreign aid recipients and 
many of the other 137 nation states appear to be less clear examples of the effectiveness 
of U.S. foreign aid allocations. 
The Center for Global Development prepares an annual brief entitled the Quality 
of Official Development Assistance (QuODA), which measures the quality of aid 
allocated by donor countries based on 31 indicators. According to a 2014 report from 
Center for Global Development, “The indicators are grouped into four dimensions 
associated with effective aid: maximizing efficiency, fostering institutions, reducing the 
burden on partner countries, and transparency and learning.” In addition, it explains,  “the 
2014 edition finds that donors are overall becoming more transparent and better at 
fostering partner country institutions but that there has been little progress at maximizing 
                                                 
40 Jewish Virtual Library, “United Nations: Voting Coincidence with the United States,” last modified 
July 2016, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/votetoc.html.  
41 Amoros, “The United States Spends $35 Billion on Foreign Aid.”  
42 Ibid.   
43 Foreign Aid Explorer, “USAID,” July 27, 2015, https://explorer.usaid.gov/aid-
dashboard.html#2013.  
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efficiency or reducing the burden on partner countries.”44 As for the United States, the 
QuODA found that its performance was mediocre and that there were significant 
improvements that could be implemented. The area in which was in most need of 
potential transformation is the U.S. tendency not to contribute to multi-lateral 
engagements and coordinated missions.45 Adding to the relatively low ranking of U.S. 
foreign aid effectiveness was the fact that it tends to spend more than most countries to 
recipient countries that have poorer governance and allocated monies to more recipient 
countries than any other donor-country.46 
There is no better example than the newest country on the globe, South Sudan, to 
elucidate the potential negative effects, or at least lack of positive effects, of significant 
foreign aid allocation. South Sudan is located in East Africa but sits very near the center 
of the continent. South Sudan gained its independence from the country of Sudan in July 
of 2011, and this effectively put an end to the longest-running civil war on the continent 
of Africa.47 The United States held a significant interest in seeing South Sudan succeed 
and prosper. Moreover, the United States had been a key participant in the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which culminated in South Sudan 
independence and succession from Sudan. The newly elected president, Salva Kiir 
Mayardit, and other government officials appeared dedicated to instilling democracy as 
its form of government. The relationship between the United States and South Sudan was 
a strong one, and South Sudan was to be the shining model of democracy on the African 
continent and an example to other nations in the region. South Sudan had significant 
resources in the form of oil in the Abeyi region and received hundreds of millions of 
dollars in foreign assistance from the United States as well as from other countries. In 
spite of the millions of dollars received in foreign aid, South Sudan experienced 
                                                 
44 Nabil Hashmi, Nancy Birdsall, and Homi Kharas, The Quality of Official Development Assistance 




47 “South Sudan Country Profile,” BBC, August 2, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
14069082.  
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significant instability since President Kiir dismissed then vice president, Riek Machar, in 
December 2013—a mere 18 months after independence.  
In the nearly three years following the onset of conflict in South Sudan, an 
estimated 2.4 million people have been displaced. Though it is difficult to determine 
previse estimates, United Nations officials surmise that at least 50,000 individuals have 
been killed, while other agencies believe that this number could be a gross 
underestimate.48 Though the United States and other donors are critical of some of the 
tactics the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has employed to quell the ongoing civil 
war, foreign assistance has continued to pour in. While many nations continue to allocate 
foreign assistance to South Sudan, the United States remains the single leading donor 
“and provides significant humanitarian assistance to the hundreds of thousands of South 
Sudanese citizens displaced or otherwise affected since the start of the crisis.”49 It also 
continues to help the GoSS provide basic services to citizens; to promote effective, 
inclusive, and accountable governance; to diversify the economy; and to combat 
poverty.”50 
Department of State officials propose that  
Increasing stability in South Sudan will require strengthening core 
institutions and governance processes to make them more inclusive, 
responding to the expectations of the population for essential services and 
improved livelihoods, and containing conflicts and addressing the 
grievances behind them.”51  
However, even with nearly $2 billion obligated by the United States to South Sudan since 
2012, and 75 percent of those funds spent after the onset of violence, the situation has 
only continued to deteriorate. As recently as mid-October 2016, GoSS forces were 
                                                 
48 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan,” accessed 
October 15, 2016, http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan; Fleur Launspach, “UN: Tens of Thousands Killed 
in South Sudan War,” Al Jazeera, March 3, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/tens-thousands-
killed-south-sudan-war-160303054110110.html.  
49 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with South 




involved in heavy fighting in Malakal, South Sudan,52 and while many were likely 
rebels, it is almost inevitable that others were simply South Sudanese residents of the 
wrong tribe, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. This story plays out over and over 
throughout the country of South Sudan, and no amount of foreign aid is going to change 
the direction that the country is currently going. We would suggest that U.S. foreign aid 
allocated to nations with politics divided along ethnic lines and in the throes of an ethnic 
civil war—like South Sudan—in addition to being ineffective, potentially perpetuates the 
ability of the state to continue its activities. We understand that it is the responsibility of 
the state to monopolize the ability to use violence and protect its people and the state 
itself. We suggest that appropriate analysis must be conducted to determine which nation 
states we support with our foreign aid, when allocating that foreign aid is a good 
investment, and when to stop terminate assistance. 
In the case of South Sudan, we do not necessarily propose that the desire to 
support it at independence was unwarranted, nor perhaps was it even unwarranted 
continued support upon the onset of conflict. However, at this point, South Sudan appears 
to be a sinking ship, and the government has perpetuated many atrocities. Countries with 
insufficient capital cannot afford to maintain the monopoly on the use of force and fight 
legitimate or illegitimate threats. South Sudan received approximately $1.4 billion in 
2013,53 and just under $400 million came from the United States.54 A legitimate concern 
of donor countries should be if their monies and activities offset monies that the central 
government would otherwise have to spend, what is the government doing with the funds 
that are not allocated to interventions? It is imperative that donor aid does not assist a 
countries ability to continue to perpetuate atrocities. This is a legitimate concern in South 
Sudan, and donors must ensure that their interventions designed to mitigate suffering do 
not ultimately prolong conflict and suffering. If it is determined that this is the case in 
                                                 
52 Denis Dumo, “Fighting Around South Sudan Town of Malakal Kills 56: Government,” Reuters, 
October 16, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-violence-idUSKBN12G0WV.  
53 Global Humanitarian Assistance, “South Sudan: Key Figures 2013,” 2013, 
www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/south-sudan.  
54 Inside Gov, “How Much Money Does the U.S. Give to South Sudan?,” accessed October 15, 2016, 
Us-foreign-aid.insidegov.com/q/198/1590/How-much-money-does-the-U-S-give-to-South-Sudan.  
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South Sudan, or any other country to which foreign aid is allocated, a change in type of 
intervention or how it is implemented is warranted.  Finally, when and if a change in 
intervention and implementation is deemed warranted, it is imperative that donors and 
government officials alike prepare for what authors de Ree and Nillesen refer to as “aid 
shock”.  Aid shock refers to potential shift of power between rebels and the sovereign 
government associated with reducing or terminating aid, as well as the response from 
those individuals receiving aid.55 De Ree and Nillesen are not the only researchers that 
have attempted to address some of the potential issues associated with terminating aid.  
A team of five authors from Harvard and Brigham Young Universities addressed the 
issue in their article “Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict” and 
found that “severe decreases in aid revenues—[can] inadvertently shift the domestic 
balance of power and potentially induce violence.”56 Reinforcing this position in an 
International Studies Quarterly article, author Neil Narang argues “that aid can 
inadvertently increase each combatant's uncertainty about the other side's 
relative strength”57 thereby potentially prolonging conflict. Ambiguity regarding the 
amount of aid a recipient might receive and potential drastic reductions in aid 
allocations can potentially create violence where there is none, provoke it where the 
grounds are fertile, provide a platform for a rebel cause, and undermine the sovereign 
government. 
55 Joppe De Ree, and Eleonora Nillesen, “Aiding violence or peace? The impact of foreign aid on the 
risk of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Development Economics 88, no. 2 (2009): 301–313. 
56 Richard A. Nielsen et al., “Foreign aid shocks as a cause of violent armed conflict,” American 
Journal of Political Science 55, no. 2 (2011): 219–232. 
57 Neil Narang. “Assisting uncertainty: how humanitarian aid can inadvertently prolong civil war.” 
International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 1 (2015): 184–195. 
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IV. DATASETS AND METHOD 
A. DATASETS 
Research for this project used six datasets to formulate the results. The World 
Development Indicators (WDIs) provided information regarding country population, 
gross domestic product (GDP), education levels for those 15 years and younger, 
government effectiveness, the rule of law estimate, the poverty headcount ratio at 
national poverty line as a percent of the population, the total aid disbursement for general 
environment protection, the total aid disbursement for basic health, and polity. The WDIs 
were selected based on their relationship to the categories of foreign aid implemented 
throughout the world. The WDI dataset was compiled by the World Bank from officially 
recognized international sources and last updated on May 2, 2016.58  
The second dataset used was the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). It 
measures the onset of conflict from 1960–2015. The UCDP has been collecting data since 
1980 and defines conflict as a minimum of 25 battle related deaths in a single year as an 
active conflict country.59 The UCDP dataset is internationally recognized and is 
becoming the standard for use in armed conflict research. 
The third dataset came from the Center for Systemic Peace and included polity 
scores. This dataset records “annual, cross-national, time-series and polity-case formats 
coding democratic and autocratic “patterns of authority” and regime changes in all 
independent countries with total population greater than 500,000 in 2015.”60 This 
variable measures state democratic levels ranging from autocracies at the low end of the 
scale with -10 to democracies at the high end of the scale with 10. This dataset was used 
to create a control variable of polity for each of the models. 
                                                 
58 World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” last modified May 2, 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
59 Erik Melander, “Upsalla Conflict Data Program—An Overview,” Uppsala University, accessed 
May 25, 2016, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/program_overview/.  
60 Center for Systemic Peace., “INSCR Data Page.” 2014. Accessed November 26, 2016. 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. 
22 
The final three datasets were compilations of foreign aid executed by the 
Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), and USAID. These 
databases were retrieved from the Foreign Assistance database, which collects 
information quarterly from each of the U.S. government agencies implementing foreign 
aid to ensure foreign aid spending transparency.61 Each organizational dataset was 
scoped down to the country in which the foreign aid was implemented, the year it was 
implemented, the foreign aid category, and how much was spent in U.S. dollars on each 
project. There are nine categories of foreign aid: peace and security, democracy, human 
rights and governance, wealth, education and social services, economic development, 
environment, humanitarian assistance, program management, and multi-sector. These 
categories include, but are not limited to, projects such as agricultural development 
projects to increase economic development or building schools and hospitals to address 
education levels and health concerns, such as mortality rates.  
B. METHOD 
The research relied on running multiple regressions with the use of a statistical 
programming language called “R.” The software allowed the researchers to compile 
multiple datasets into one and examine the regression results. The research first 
identified the the variables with the highest significance to stability and then applied 
those variable to the foreign aid models. 
1. Stability Indicators
The researchers chose several independent variables to determine their 
significance in indicating the likelihood of the onset of internal conflict as the 
dichotomous dependent variable (DV), with a country/year unit of analysis. The 
researchers used onset of internal conflict as an indicator of stability to help determine 
whether various factors have promoted stability. The models included covariates 
measuring population, GDP, education levels, military spending, rule of law, government 
effectiveness, the poverty ratio at national poverty line, and regime type (polity) in a 
61 Foreign Assistance, “Beta.” 
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series of logistic regressions to determine the relationship between these independent 
variables and the onset of internal conflict. The researchers chose these variables as 
potential indicators for stability. Higher education levels and low poverty are usually 
common within stable countries.  Analyzing these stability indicators provides insight 
into which indicators have the most significant impact on the stability of a country. The 
researchers selected poverty ratio, government effectiveness, rule of law, and education 
as variables that may contribute to the onset of conflict but also similarly match the sum 
of the categories of foreign aid. Also, the researchers used GDP, total population and 
polity as control variables in each of the three initial models. Additionally, the 
researchers created a fourth control variable to measure how many years during the 
previous five years, a country endured conflict, with a one-year lag behind the years 
evaluated. This provides the recent history of conflict, not including the current year. This 
variable allows the researchers to determine how likely a country is to experience conflict 
in the current year given how much conflict it has endured in the previous five years. 
The authors created three different logistic models to test the significance of each 
of the variables (logistic regression was chosen due to the use of a binary dependent 
variable). Internal conflict Model 1 included government effectiveness, primary 
education level, while controlling military spending, GDP, population, and polity as 
control variables. Model 2 added poverty and included primary education level, 
government effectiveness, while controlling for military spending, GDP, population, and 
polity as control variables. Poverty was removed from model 2 to determine if primary 
education became a more significant variable while holding the other variables constant. 
Model 3 removed poverty but added rule of law and included government effectiveness 
while controlling for military spending, GDP, population, and polity as control variables. 
Poverty was removed from model 3 to determine if poverty became a more significant 
variable while holding the other variables constant.  
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2. Foreign Aid Models 
The foreign aid models for DOD, DOS, and USAID all followed the same basic 
logistic model form. The researchers scrutinized the foreign assistance datasets for each 
agency for each of the nine categories of foreign aid arranging them by total projects and 
cost before organizing them by country and year. After the researchers summed the 
projects by cost and count, they were merged with the internal conflict dataset as well as 
the WDI dataset. To assess effects from aid that might occur over multiple years 
following the start of a project, the researchers opted to use the incidence of conflict as 
the dependent variable, which records each year of conflict as opposed to the just the year 
the conflict started.   
To create the cost models, the researchers created six different formula cost 
models that were included in analyzing the cost effectiveness of the categories for the 
DOD, DOS, and USAID. Formula cost v1 used the incidence of conflict as the dependent 
variable and included total cost, GDP, population, and polity2 as the independent 
variables. Formula Cost v2 included all the variables from formula cost model 1 and 
added the lag variable for the incidence of conflict from the previous five years. Cost 
formula v3 added peace and security cost , health cost , democracy cost, economic cost, 
education cost, and humanitarian assistance cost to Formula Cost v2. Cost formula v4 
added education cost + 1 to Formula Cost v2. Cost Formula v5 added democracy cost to 
Formula cost v2. Cost Formula v6 added peace and security cost to Formula cost v2.  
To create the count models, the researchers created five different formula count 
models. The count models were included in analyzing the effectiveness of the number of 
projects for the categories performed by the DOD, DOS, and USAID. Formula count v1 
used the incidence of conflict as the dependent variable and included total count, GDP, 
population, and polity2 as the independent variables. Formula Count v2 included all the 
variables from formula count model 1 and added the lag variable for the incidence of 
conflict from the previous five years. Cost formula v3 added peace and security count, 
health count, democracy count, economic count, education count, and humanitarian 
assistance count to Formula Count v2. Cost formula v4 added peace and security count to 
Formula Count v2. Cost Formula v5 added health count to Formula cost v2.  
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a. Department of Defense Model 
The initial model for the DOD foreign aid cost consisted of using six of the nine 
aid categories: peace and security, health, democracy, education, economic, and 
humanitarian assistance. The researchers used these independent variables to determine 
the relationship between the cost of each category and the incidence of conflict, while 
controlling for GDP, population, polity, and the lag variable for the incidence of conflict 
from the previous five years. Upon completion of the initial cost regression, the 
researchers determined that the education cost variable had the strongest correlation to 
the incidence of conflict. The researchers used Formula Cost v4 as a result of this finding.   
In addition to analyzing the cost of the projects and their impact on the internal 
conflict, the researchers used the total count of each category. Once again, the researchers 
used the total count of each of the six categories as independent variables while 
controlling for GDP, population, polity, and the lag variable for the incidence of conflict 
from the previous five years. However, the initial cost regression determined the need to 
use Formula count v5 to analyze the number of health projects in relation to the incidence 
of conflict.  
b. Department of State Model 
The initial model for the DOS foreign aid cost consisted of using six of the nine 
aid categories: peace and security, health, democracy, education, economic, and 
humanitarian assistance. The researchers used these independent variables to determine 
the relationship between the cost of each category and the incidence of conflict, while 
controlling for GDP, log of population, polity, and the lag variable for the incidence of 
conflict from the previous five years. Upon completion of the initial cost regression, the 
researchers determined that the peace and security cost variable had the strongest 
correlation to the incidence of conflict. The researchers used Formula Cost v6 as a result 
of this finding.   
In addition to analyzing the cost of the projects and their impact on the internal 
conflict, the researchers used the total count of each category. Again, the researchers used 
the total count of each of the six categories as independent variables while controlling for 
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GDP, population, polity, and the lag variable for the incidence of conflict from the 
previous five years. However, the initial count regression determined the need to use 
Formula count v4 to analyze the number of peace and security projects in relation to the 
incidence of conflict.  
c. USAID Model 
The initial model for USAID foreign aid cost consisted of using six of the nine aid 
categories: peace and security, health, democracy, education, economic, and 
humanitarian assistance. The researchers used these independent variables to determine 
the relationship between the cost of each category and the incidence of conflict, while 
controlling for GDP, log of population, polity, and the lag variable for the incidence of 
conflict from the previous five years. Upon completion of the initial cost regression, the 
researchers determined that the democracy cost variable had the strongest correlation to 
the incidence of conflict. The researchers used Formula Cost v5 as a result of this finding.   
The researchers also analyzed the count of the projects and their impact on the 
internal conflict, the researchers used the total count of each category. Again, the 
researchers used the total count of each of the six categories as independent variables 
while controlling for GDP, population, polity, and the lag variable for the incidence of 
conflict from the previous five years. However, the initial count regression determined 
the need to use Formula count v4 to analyze the number of peace and security projects in 
relation to the incidence of conflict.  
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V. REGRESSION RESULTS 
A. STABILITY INDICATORS: PRECURSOR TO FOREIGN AID? 
The initial model analyzing which stability indicators have a strong negative 
correlation with internal conflict is the basis for the analysis of the effectiveness of the 
foreign aid models. Analyzing the headcount poverty ratio, primary education level, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, while controlling for military spending, GDP, 
population, and polity indicators demonstrated which indicators proved most effective in 
reducing the onset of internal conflict. Government effectiveness was the most significant 
indicator in reducing the onset of internal conflict with a p-value=0.0000664. Therefore, 
the model predicts with 99.9 percent confidence that government effectiveness has a 
strong negative correlation to the onset of internal conflict, as seen in Figure 2. (See 
Appendix A for complete regression results of the stability indicators as a precursor to 




As government effectiveness increases, the probability of internal conflict decreases. The 
x-axis represents the quality of government effectiveness ranging from -2.0 to 1 (-2.0 
being ineffective and 1 being highly effective). The gray shaded area represents the 95% 
confidence interval. The y-axis represents the probability of the onset of internal conflict 
(0 being no conflict and 1 being total conflict). 
Figure 2.  Government Effectiveness and the Probability of Conflict Onset 
Figure 2 clearly illustrates that as governments become increasingly effective, 
their incidence of internal conflict sharply decreases. The x-axis represents the quality of 
government effectiveness ranging from -2.0 to 2.5 (-2.0 being ineffective and 2.5 being 
highly effective). The gray shaded error represents the margin of error due to fewer 
available observations of the government effectiveness indicator The y-axis represents 
the probability of the onset of internal conflict (0 being no conflict and 0.2 being 
conflict). Therefore, one would expect the USG to focus on democracy and governance 
projects as well as program management to improve government effectiveness in the 
countries in which U.S. foreign aid is implemented.  
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Education levels also had a strong negative relationship to the onset of internal 
conflict. Although not quite as significant as government effectiveness, education showed 
that countries with individuals (both male and female) 15 years and younger who 
received a primary education had less of a chance of plunging into internal conflict. The 
primary education indicator measured a p-value = 0.0545. Therefore, the model predicts 
with 95 percent confidence primary education has a strong negative correlation to the 
onset of internal conflict.  
As a result of the analysis of the stability indicators, it seems that the United 
States should focus more of its efforts on programs that will increase government 
effectiveness and primary education instead of programs such as health, rule of law, and 
economic development to reduce poverty. Although the latter programs may help a 
country move into a first world or developed country, they do not appear to be 
contributing to reducing the onset of internal conflict. Therefore, they are not contributing 
to the stabilization of a country.  
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOREIGN AID 
Spending over $21.66 billion from 2011 to 2015, the DOD implemented six 
categories of foreign aid including humanitarian assistance, peace and security, 
democracy, human rights and governance, health, education, and economic projects. The 
projects were measured, both in cost and total number of projects implemented per 
category, to determine which category of projects had the strongest relationship with the 
onset of internal conflict.  
Education project costs, although not particularly strong, had the strongest 
positive relationship with the incidence of internal conflict as compared to all other 
category project costs. It was the most significant with a p-value = 0.113044 (See 
Appendix B for complete regression results). Therefore, the model predicts with 
approximately 88 percent confidence that education projects have a positive correlation 
to the incidence of internal conflict when compared to the other categories of foreign aid. 
The DOD spent $123.37 million from 2011 to 2015 on education projects. Figure 3 
shows how the incidence of internal conflict appears to weakly decrease as the DOD 
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spends more on education projects, though the relatively high high p-value, reflected in 
the wide confidence bands, indicates there is little statistical confidence in the 
relationship. (See Appendix B for complete regression results of the DOD foreign 
aid costs.) 
 
Internal conflict decreases with more money spent on education projects. The x-axis 
represents the cost of education projects performed within a year. The gray shaded area 
represents the 95% confidence interval. The y-axis represents the probability of the onset 
of internal conflict (0 being no conflict and 1 being total conflict). 
Figure 3.  DOD Education Costs and the Probability of Conflict Incidence 
However, when considering the number of projects rather than the cost, the total 
count of health projects was the most significant variable when compared to the number 
of projects from the other categories. The DOD implemented 568 health projects from 
2011 to 2015. The health project count had a coefficient of -0.73165 and a p-value of 
0.07864. Therefore, the model predicts with 90 percent confidence that health projects 
have a negative correlation to the incidence of internal conflict. Consequently, as the 
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number of projects for health increases, the likelihood of the incidence of internal conflict 
decreases, as seen in Figure 4.  
 
Internal conflict gradually decreases as more health projects are implemented. The x-axis 
represents the number of health projects performed within a year. The gray shaded area 
represents the 95% confidence interval. The y-axis represents the probability of the onset 
of internal conflict (0 being no conflict and 1 being total conflict). 
Figure 4.  DOD Health Project Count and the Probability of Conflict Incidence 
C. DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOREIGN AID 
Spending over $34.2 billion and implementing 116,109 projects from 2012 to 
2015, the DOS implemented eight categories of foreign aid including humanitarian 
assistance, peace and security, democracy, human rights and governance, health, program 
management, economic, and multi-sector projects. The projects were measured, in both 
cost and total number of projects implemented per category, to determine which category 
of projects had the strongest relationship with the onset of internal conflict.  
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Peace and security project costs had the strongest positive correlation with the 
incidence of internal conflict with a p-value = 0.012512. Therefore, the model predicts 
with 99 percent confidence that health and security project costs have a strong positive 
correlation to the incidence of internal conflict. The DOS spent $7.3 billion from 2012 to 
2015 on peace and security projects. Therefore, in four years, the DOS spent over 50 
times the amount spent by the DOD in same period. According to our results, both DOD 
and DOS spending levels had little positive impact on reducing internal conflict. 
Moreover, it appears that DOS spending on peace and security programs may 
actually generate increased levels of conflict. Figure 5 shows how that while cost of 
peace and security projects increases, the incidence of internal conflict also increase.  
Internal conflict gradually increasing as peace and security project cost increase. The x-
axis represents the cost of peace and security projects performed within a year. The gray 
shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval. The y-axis represents the probability 
of the onset of internal conflict (0 being no conflict and 1 being total conflict). 
Figure 5.  DOS Peace and Security Project Cost and the Probability 
of Conflict Incidence 
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The total count of peace and security projects was also a significant variable 
when compared to the number of projects from the other categories. The DOS 
implemented 64,132 peace and security projects from 2012 to 2015. The peace and 
security project count had a p-value= 0.073537. Therefore, the model predicts with 90 
percent confidence that DOS peace and security projects have a positive correlation to the 
incidence of internal conflict. (See Appendix C for the complete Foreign Aid Project 
Count regression results.) However, it is important to remember that it is possible DOS 
peace and security projects were implemented after the incidence of internal conflict to 
mitigate violence and conflict which had already erupted. Figure 6 shows that while the 
number of peace and security projects increases, the incidence of internal conflict also 
increases. 
Internal conflict gradually increasing as more peace and security projects are 
implemented. The x-axis represents the number of humanitarian assistance projects 
performed within a year. The gray shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval. 
The y-axis represents the probability of the onset of internal conflict (0 being no conflict 
and 1 being total conflict). 
Figure 6.  DOS Peace and Security Project Cost and the Probability 
of Conflict Incidence 
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D. UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Spending over $115.7 billion from 2013 to 2015, USAID implemented five 
categories of foreign aid, including humanitarian assistance, peace and security, 
democracy, human rights and governance, education, and economic projects. The 
projects were measured, in both cost and total number of projects implemented per 
category, to determine which category of projects had the strongest relationship with the 
onset of internal conflict.  
Democracy project costs, followed closely by peace and security project costs, 
had the strongest positive correlation with the incidence of internal conflict compared to 
all other category project costs. Democracy was the most significant category with a p-
value = 0.06824. Therefore, the model predicts with over 90 percent confidence that 
democracy project costs had a positive correlation to the onset of internal conflict when 
compared to the other categories of foreign aid. The USAID spent $7.54 billion from 
2013 to 2015 on democracy projects. Figure 7 shows how the likelihood of internal 
conflict appears to increases as the USAID spends more money on democracy projects. 
Peace and security project costs had the second strongest positive relationship 
with the incidence of internal conflict, with a p-value = 0.07159. Therefore, the model 
predicts with over 90 percent confidence that peace and security project costs had a 
positive correlation to the onset of internal conflict when compared to the other 
categories of foreign aid. The USAID spent $3.4 billion from 2013 to 2015 on peace and 
security projects. This runs counter to the notion that peace and security projects should 
prevent internal conflict and ease the suffering for citizens of a country during a time of 
conflict. (See Appendix B for complete regression results of the USAID foreign aid). 
Similar to DOS, it is important to remember that USAID peace and security projects may 
have been implemented after the initial incidence of internal conflict to mitigate ongoing 
violence and conflict. It may also be possible that as conflict continues, increasing peace 
and security projects actually promote further conflict.  
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As democracy costs increase so does the incidence of internal conflict. The x-axis 
represents the total cost of democracy projects performed within a year. The gray shaded 
area represents the 95% confidence interval. The y-axis represents the probability of the 
incidence of internal conflict (0 being no conflict and 1 being total conflict). 
Figure 7.  USAID Democracy Cost and the Probability of Conflict Incidence 
The total count of peace and security projects was also a significant variable 
when compared to the number of projects from the other categories. USAID 
implemented 5,123 peace and security projects from 2013 to 2015. The peace and 
security project count had a p-value= 0.112654. Therefore, the model predicts with 
approximately 89 percent confidence that USAID peace and security projects have a 
positive correlation to the incidence of internal conflict. (See APPENDIX C for the 
complete Foreign Aid Project Count regression results.) However, it is important to 
remember that it is possible USAID peace and security projects were implemented after 
the incidence of internal conflict to mitigate violence and conflict which had already 
erupted. Figure 8 shows how that while the number of USAID peace and security 
projects increases, the incidence of internal conflict also increase. 
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Internal conflict gradually increasing as more peace and security projects are 
implemented. The x-axis represents the number of humanitarian assistance projects 
performed within a year. The gray shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval. 
The y-axis represents the probability of the onset of internal conflict (0 being no conflict 
and 1 being total conflict). 
Figure 8.  USAID Peace and Security Count and the Probability 




While not always the case, the onset of conflict can be a precursor to the decay of 
a nation-state and may even culminate in becoming a failed state. In Western security 
policy thinking, it has become conventional wisdom that poor state performance—
generally referred to using terms such as “weak” or “fragile” states, “failing” or “failed” 
states—and violent conflicts are closely related. State fragility is seen to engender violent 
conflict, which in turn can lead to state failure or even collapse. Moreover, regions of 
state fragility are perceived as breeding grounds and safe havens for transnational 
terrorism, weapons proliferation, and organized crime. Hence, state fragility not only 
affects the citizens of the state and society in question, but also neighboring states and the 
international community at large.62 
The need to address instability prior to the onset of conflict is extremely 
important. It is equally as important that the most effective and efficient means are 
employed by the most efficient and effective agency or organization. In the words of 
authors Natasha M. Ezrow and Erika Frantz in their book entitled Failed States and 
Institutional Decay, policy makers are concerned, legitimately we suggest, that failed 
states and the effects of failed states regional boundaries affect the global community at 
large.63 There are too many examples of insurgent groups using ungoverned spaces in 
unstable, failing, or failed states to plan and practice attacks on the United States and 
American interests. These attacks have been executed on American soil and on American 
interests abroad. They have been perpetrated against allies of the United States as well as 
states that are not friendly to the United States. The attacks on the USS Cole, the World 
Trade Center, and the spread of ISIS are examples that failed and failing states represent 
a clear and present danger to the United States of America, its allies, and every sovereign 
nation across the globe. Foreign aid is not going to prevent attacks on the United States, 
                                                 
62 Volker M. Boege Anne Brown, and Kevin P. Clements, “Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile 
States,” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice 21, no. 1 (2009): 13–21, doi: 
10.1080/10402650802689997.  
63 Natasha M. Exrow and Erika Frantz, Failed States and Institutional Decay: Understanding 
Instability and Poverty in the Developing World (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).   
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nor will foreign aid alone bolster state stability enough to ensure that every sovereign 
nation will survive. Foreign aid must be nested within each foreign policy initiative, 
military action, and diplomatic engagement. 
The empirical findings in the research and analysis that the authors have 
conducted reinforces the assertion that extreme poverty does not inherently lead to state-
instability or the onset of conflict. The United States has spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars in foreign aid interventions across the globe in the health, environmental, rule of 
law, and general economic development sectors. This research has found virtually no 
positive relationship between the monies spent on foreign aid interventions in these 
sectors and mitigation of internal state conflict or stymieing its onset. If the intent of 
disseminating foreign aid is strictly philanthropic, designed primarily to alleviate human 
suffering, a case can be made that each and every intervention is an efficient, effective, 
and positive one. One fewer hungry mouth, each additional woman with access to 
prenatal care, each additional job created for an individual who did not previously have 
one is an improvement and a success when positive intervention is itself the desired end 
state. From a strictly philanthropic perspective, the United States has had an impact on 
three-quarters of the sovereign nations on the globe,64 disseminating hundreds of billions 
of dollars in foreign aid and assisting hundreds of millions of people. As a means of 
building state stability, mitigating conflict, and as an extension of foreign policy, our 
research indicates that U.S. foreign aid allocations have been considerably less effective 
and have had little positive impacts. Therefore, considerable adjustments should be 
implemented. 
As an extension of foreign policy, it appears that foreign aid allocations spent in 
the government effectiveness and education sectors will be most effective at increasing 
state stability. If foreign aid allocations are not simply philanthropic, the United States 
should consider significant revisions to its foreign aid policy. While we will address each 
individually, we propose two key areas that must be reconsidered. First and foremost, if 
foreign aid monies allocated to particular sectors are not effective, allocations to those 
                                                 
64 Amoros, “The United States Spends $35 Billion on Foreign Aid.”  
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sectors should be reduced or terminated, and the monies reallocated to sectors that 
have significant positive impacts. Secondly, the United States must become considerably 
more selective in the countries selected to receive foreign aid.  
The quantitative portion of this analysis considered the effects of foreign aid 
interventions in nine sectors: peace and security, democracy, human rights and 
governance, health, education and social services, economic development, environment, 
humanitarian assistance, program management, and multi-sector. Of the nine categories, 
two categories (education cost and the number of health projects performed by the DOD) 
had a negative relationship to the incidence of internal conflict. The model indicated 
these categories slightly reduced the incidence of internal conflict. However, the 
model also indicated a strong relationship did not exist. Additionally, the models 
indicated that DOS peace and security costs and count had a strong, positive relationship 
with the incidence of conflict. The models also indicated USAID democracy project costs 
and the number of peace and security projects performed had a strong, positive 
relationship with the incidence of conflict. Considering the millions of dollars spent on 
each category by each aid organization, it is expected to see a strong, negative 
relationship between the categories implemented and the incidence of conflict (projects 
implemented should reduce the incidence of conflict). The models suggest these activities 
may actually provoke internal conflict. Therefore, why is the USG spending millions of 
dollars on these activities without the benefit of reducing internal conflict and thus 
increasing stability? 
Additionally, this research shows that government effectiveness and education 
had the most significant relationship with the onset of internal conflict. Therefore, it can 
be expected that governance programs aimed at increasing government effectiveness and 
education programs would be the most effective projects. However, the results suggest 
these types of projects have little impact on internal conflict. It may be possible that the 
USG is not as effective as it thinks at implementing these types of projects. Responsible 
individuals must prepare to make difficult decisions. From a global perspective, research 
indicates that this implies spending less in sectors like health and the environment and 
more in the education and governance sectors. While neither will have an instantaneous 
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positive impact, they are investments in the future. Finally, executors of foreign 
assistance should not look at the effectiveness of foreign aid at a global level but at a state 
level, and if possible, at a regional level within the state. 
When the appropriate analysis is conducted to determine which sectors should be 
invested in, the next gate is to ensure that the potential recipient country is a viable 
recipient. Assuming that the primary sectors to invest foreign aid monies in are the 
sectors that our quantitative analysis suggested are the most effective, education and 
governance, a requisite analysis must be conducted to determine that the potential 
recipient country has the infrastructure and capacity to benefit from the foreign aid 
intervention. Returning to our previous example of South Sudan, we suggest that 
additional analysis must be conducted to determine if foreign aid should continue to be 
allocated to the GoSS directly. Though investment in primary education may prove 
beneficial, we suggest that any type of intervention should be very closely monitored. If 
permissible, foreign aid monies allocated through an independent entity, as opposed to 
through the central government, would increase transparency; a valuable quality, 
especially in a country that has exploited its youth in the form of child soldiers. 
In closing, in the contemporary environment in which each agency and 
organization is being asked to be effective, albeit with fewer personnel, less monies, and 
fewer resources, we implore foreign aid policy makers, executors, and implementers to 
disseminate foreign aid efficiently and with a purpose. Each member of the Department 
of Defense, Department of State, and the United States Agency for International 
Development must serve as a responsible stewards of government resources. 
Additionally, the American taxpayer expects results. While the American taxpayer might 
support humanitarian assistance intervention in certain circumstances, it should not be in 
perpetuity, and foreign aid must be allocated responsibly. Foreign aid allocations should 
result in positive results: increased security, mutually beneficial relationships, and 
stronger allies. 
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APPENDIX A.  STABILITY INDICATORS: PRECURSOR TO FOREIGN 
AID 
The complete regression results of the stability indicators as a precursor to foreign aid are 
listed in the following table. In the table, note: *p**p***p<0.01. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Civil Conflict Onset 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 government_effectiveness -0.7545*** -0.6271** -0.7912 
 (0.1892) (0.2971) (0.4968) 
    poverty_ratio  -0.0071  
  (0.0099)  
    rule_of_law   -0.5069 
   (0.4141) 
    log(military_spending + 1) 1.1013*** 1.0389*** 0.4863** 
 (0.1578) (0.2189) (0.2056) 
    log(primary_edu_all + 1) -0.6522* -1.3743** -1.0735** 
 (0.3391) (0.5718) (0.4296) 
    log(gdp) -0.2316** -0.2663* 0.0520 
 (0.0977) (0.1560) (0.1501) 
    log(pop) 0.5969*** 0.7703*** 0.4230*** 
 (0.0584) (0.0906) (0.1054) 
    polity2 0.0426** 0.0386 -0.0048 
 (0.0175) (0.0283) (0.0327) 
    Constant -9.6846*** -8.8189*** -6.7250*** 
 (1.7435) (3.2493) (2.5219) 
     Observations 2,641 1,207 858 
Log Likelihood -504.7005 -271.8442 -238.0155 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,023.4010 559.6884 492.0309 
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APPENDIX B.  FOREIGN AID COST 
The complete regression results of foreign aid cost are shown in the following table. The models were altered by adding 





Civil Conflict Incidence 
DOD DoS USAID 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
log(total_cost + 1) 0.1922* 0.0556   0.3629
*** 0.4026*   0.0854 0.0761   
 (0.0990) (0.1577)   (0.1335) (0.2208)   (0.0530) (0.0766)   
             log(Peace_and_Security_cost + 1)   0.0945    0.5736
* 0.7088**   0.4546
*  
   (0.1762)    (0.3471) (0.2838)   (0.2523)  
             log(Health_cost + 1)   -0.1708    -0.1067    0.0090  
   (0.3226)    (0.6600)    (0.2253)  
             log(Democracy_cost + 1)   13.0199    0.3766    0.5513
* 0.3772*** 
   (452.8329)    (0.5925)    (0.3024) (0.1406) 
             log(Economic_cost + 1)   -1.8642        -0.3333  
   (4.4667)        (0.2819)  
             log(Education_cost + 1)   -3.2073 -0.5191       0.1161  
   (2.0240) (0.8824)       (0.3157)  
             log(Humanitarian_Assistance_cost 
+ 1)   -0.0601    -4,207.2290    -0.2439  
   (0.5250)    (453,551.0000)    (0.1793)  
             
log(gdp) -0.3248*** -0.2727* -0.3016** -0.2825** -0.3416
*** -0.2679* -0.2940** -0.2669* -0.3156*** -0.2496* -0.2852* -0.2072 
 (0.0985) (0.1437) (0.1458) (0.1409) (0.0978) (0.1437) (0.1488) (0.1449) (0.1010) (0.1458) (0.1626) (0.1472) 
             log(pop) 0.8308*** 0.4292*** 0.4337*** 0.4308*** 0.8398*** 0.4226*** 0.4365*** 0.4403*** 0.8349*** 0.4215*** 0.3869*** 0.3858*** 
 (0.1030) (0.1384) (0.1390) (0.1382) (0.1030) (0.1373) (0.1401) (0.1380) (0.1034) (0.1389) (0.1466) (0.1392) 
             polity2 -0.0297 -0.0371 -0.0369 -0.0369 -0.0284 -0.0393 -0.0434 -0.0396 -0.0273 -0.0369 -0.0506 -0.0434 
 (0.0245) (0.0365) (0.0368) (0.0364) (0.0248) (0.0367) (0.0375) (0.0371) (0.0245) (0.0365) (0.0380) (0.0369) 
             incidence_sum5yr_lag1yr  1.0746
*** 1.0910*** 1.0849***  1.0816
*** 1.1211*** 1.0896***  1.0740
*** 1.1473*** 1.1097*** 
  (0.1029) (0.1062) (0.1036)  (0.1039) (0.1082) (0.1045)  (0.1025) (0.1172) (0.1070) 

















 (1.8052) (2.4020) (2.4114) (2.4057) (1.8072) (2.3872) (2.4288) (2.4063) (1.8091) (2.4215) (2.5370) (2.4260) 
              Observations 629 628 628 628 629 628 628 628 629 628 628 628 












104.8839 -98.3318 -101.6948 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 404.1256 222.6297 229.3810 222.4522 400.5946 219.3114 216.3682 216.5520 405.2005 221.7677 218.6635 215.3896 
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APPENDIX C.  FOREIGN AID COUNT 
The complete regression results of DOS foreign aid are listed in the following table. The initial models were altered by 





Civil Conflict Incidence 
DOD DoS USAID 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
log(total_cnt + 1) -0.0159 -0.2596   0.1443
* 0.1726   0.0274 0.0402   
 (0.1913) (0.2753)   (0.0779) (0.1173)   (0.0447) (0.0649)   
             log(Peace_and_Security_cnt + 1)   0.0187    0.3728
* 0.3829**   0.2423 0.2213 
   (0.4395)    (0.2083) (0.1624)   (0.2324) (0.1395) 
             log(Health_cnt + 1)   -0.7316
* -0.6916**   0.1541    -0.1038  
   (0.4160) (0.3461)   (0.3752)    (0.2297)  
             log(Democracy_cnt + 1)   8.4296    0.0157    0.0648  
   (548.4807)    (0.3577)    (0.2931)  
             log(Economic_cnt + 1)   -0.0530        0.3010  
   (0.8493)        (0.3533)  
             log(Education_cnt + 1)   -0.0556        -0.2701  
   (0.5770)        (0.3248)  
             log(Humanitarian_Assistance_cnt + 1)   0.1881    -14.6995    -0.0750  
   (0.4867)    (1,209.2050)    (0.1809)  
             log(gdp) -0.3686*** -0.3105** -0.3333** -0.3406** -0.3481*** -0.2753* -0.2830* -0.2684* -0.3493*** -0.2646* -0.2766* -0.2396* 
 (0.0991) (0.1433) (0.1487) (0.1447) (0.0975) (0.1435) (0.1489) (0.1448) (0.0994) (0.1445) (0.1532) (0.1448) 
             log(pop) 0.8597*** 0.4480*** 0.4249*** 0.4324*** 0.8435*** 0.4176*** 0.4578*** 0.4603*** 0.8514*** 0.4264*** 0.4399*** 0.4272*** 
 (0.1033) (0.1405) (0.1419) (0.1392) (0.1025) (0.1375) (0.1439) (0.1398) (0.1033) (0.1386) (0.1449) (0.1389) 
             polity2 -0.0259 -0.0288 -0.0236 -0.0213 -0.0245 -0.0342 -0.0404 -0.0365 -0.0264 -0.0362 -0.0333 -0.0386 
 (0.0250) (0.0374) (0.0385) (0.0376) (0.0247) (0.0366) (0.0377) (0.0370) (0.0245) (0.0364) (0.0374) (0.0365) 
             incidence_sum5yr_lag1yr  1.0888
*** 1.1138*** 1.1145***  1.0850
*** 1.1221*** 1.0880***  1.0785
*** 1.0915*** 1.0687*** 
  (0.1040) (0.1082) (0.1073)  (0.1039) (0.1083) (0.1042)  (0.1025) (0.1075) (0.1027) 
             Constant -13.1118*** -8.1300*** -7.6839*** -7.7167*** -13.1683*** -8.3138*** -8.9905*** -9.1141*** -13.2060*** -8.4715*** -8.6599*** -8.7296*** 
 (1.8105) (2.4372) (2.4411) (2.4408) (1.7980) (2.3841) (2.5048) (2.4479) (1.8019) (2.4145) (2.5178) (2.4460) 
              Observations 629 628 628 628 629 628 628 628 629 628 628 628 
Log Likelihood -198.8844 -104.9319 -102.9805 -103.3229 -197.2405 -104.3056 -99.7085 -102.6415 -198.7010 -105.1855 -102.9916 -104.1330 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 407.7688 221.8637 227.9610 218.6459 404.4810 220.6113 217.4170 217.2829 407.4019 222.3710 227.9832 220.2660 
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